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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

: Case No. 930114-CA

v.

:

JOSEPH C. VALDEZ,

: Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of tampering with
evidence, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-8-510 (1990), in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Summit County, State of Utah, the Honorable Frank G. Noel,
presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The sole issue presented in this appeal is:
1.

Was thereKsufficient evidence to prove that

defendant, aware that an investigation was in progress or that an
official proceeding was imminent, intentionally removed an
intoxilyzer test record and checklist from a booking room with
the purpose of impairing the investigation or the proceeding?
When challenging the jury's verdict, the defendant must show that
the evidence and its inferences are so "inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of

which he was convicted."
(Utah 1983).

State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444

" [S]o long as some evidence and reasonable

inferences support the jury's findings, [the appellate court]
will not disturb them.
(Utah 1985)."

See State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345

State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App.

1990) . To meet this burden, defendant must marshal all the
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that even
viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below, the
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict.

Failure to so

marshal the evidence waives an appellant's right to have his
claim of insufficiency considered on appeal. Id. at 738-39.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules are attached at Addendum A where not set forth in the body
of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Joseph C. Valdez, was charged by information
with tampering with evidence, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1990) (Count I), driving
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp.
1992) (Count II), driving a motor vehicle while license was
suspended or revoked, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-136 (Supp. 1992) (Count III), open container of
alcohol in a motor vehicle, a class C misdemeanor, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.20 (Supp. 1992) (Count IV), and use
2

of a license plate registered to another vehicle, a class C
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1305 (Supp.
1992) (Count V) (R. 02-03) . Count III was dismissed at the
preliminary hearing (R. 11-A).
A jury found defendant guilty on Counts I, II, IV and V
(R. 83, 85, 87, 89). At sentencing the second degree felony for
tampering with evidence (Count I) was reduced to a third degree
felony, and defendant was sentenced to a term of zero to five
years in the Utah State Prison on that count (R. 95-96).
Defendant was sentenced to terms of six months on Count II and
ninety days on both Counts IV and V (R. 96). All terms were
ordered to be served concurrently to each other and consecutively
to any other sentences defendant was then serving in the Utah
State Prison (R. 96).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 16, 1992, Utah Highway Patrolman Paul Brown
arrested defendant for driving while under the influence of
alcohol (hereinafter "DUI") following defendant's substandard
performance on field sobriety tests and booked him into the
Summit County Jail (T. 2, 15-23, 27). Obtaining defendant's
consent to an intoxilyzer test, Patrolman Brown generated an
intoxilyzer checklist (State's Ex. 1) and a test record (State's
Ex. 2), which showed, respectively, the test to have been
administered in accordance with established procedures and
defendant's blood alcohol content to be .185 grams of alcohol,
more than twice the legal limit (T. 28-38, 64; State's Ex. 2).
3

After informing defendant of the results of the test,
Patrolman Brown placed the checklist and test record on the
booking table, between defendant and him (T. 37-38).

A few feet

away, seated on the same side of the booking table, Edwin Thacker
of the Summit County Sheriff's Office, then on jail duty, took
identification information and logged defendant into the computer
(T. 71-76).

Defendant then asked permission to use the restroom,

and Officer Thacker accompanied him to the drunk tank where
defendant used the toilet (T. 39, 74-75).

Defendant and Officer

Thacker returned to the booking area, but seven minutes later, as
Officer Brown continued processing the DUI report form and
Officer Thacker continued at the computer on the intake process,
defendant again asked to use the restroom (T. 40, 75-77).
Officer Thacker again accompanied defendant to the
drunk tank (T. 77). Standing about seven feet from defendant,
Officer Thacker saw defendant stand directly in front of the
toilet with his back to him and engage him in conversation while
looking over his left shoulder:
I observed, while he was looking over
his shoulder,^his hand was in the position as
if he was using the toilet. But then I saw
something fall between his legs into the
toilet. Some object. At that time, I then
went toward him. He noticed that I had
started toward him. He pushed the flush
button, which is located on the right side
and stepped away from the toilet. And I made
a dash for the toilet and grabbed the objects
that were in the water.
(T. 78).
The objects retrieved, which had been wadded into a
4

ball, were the checklist and the test record (T. 41-42, 79).
Officer Brown confronted defendant about his destruction of
evidence in the drunk tank and recorded their exchange, in which
defendant stated that he had not been aware of what the "papers"
were or that they were important because they had been given to
him and he intended to plead guilty anyway (T. 48; State's Ex. 5,
R. 22-27) .
Defendant testified that he had been convicted of DUI
on three previous occasions and that in each case he had been
given the results of his intoxilyzer tests (T. 95). In the
booking room Officer Thacker gave him cards containing bail
information, which were placed in front of him, as though in his
own little section (T. 93-94).

The "papers," referring to

exhibits 1 and 2, were set in front of him by the cards that
Officer Thacker had given him, and defendant figured they were
his (T. 107-08).

Defendant testified that he intended to plead

guilty to DUI as soon as he was pulled over.

He assumed the

papers were a receipt for the intoxilyzer, which he threw in the
toilet because they were unimportant to him, not because he
intended to "inhibit the DUI charge at all" (T. 96-97).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could
reasonably have inferred that defendant intentionally removed an
intoxilyzer checklist and test record from the Summit County
booking room, knowing that an official proceeding related to his
arrest for DUI was imminent and that such evidence would have to
5

be available in such a proceeding.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
jury's verdict, defendant surreptitiously removed the evidence
from the area in which he was being booked and attempted to flush
it down the toilet.

Thereafter he made up excuses that he had

intended to plead guilty anyway and that he thought the checklist
and test record were merely receipts which he was free to dispose
of.

Defendant's excuses are undermined l?y the testimony of two

police officers present at the scene, and most particularly by
defendant's asking to use the toilet only minutes after having
first used it.
Such evidence and its inferences are not so
"inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime of which he was convicted."
443, 444 (Utah 1983).

State v. Petree. 659 P.2d

Further, because defendant has failed to

marshal all the evidence from which the jury might reasonably
have inferred that defendant acted with culpable intent, this
Court should decline to consider defendant's appeal on its
merits.
ARGUMENT
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FROM WHICH TO
INFER THAT DEFENDANT INTENTIONALLY DISPOSED
OF THE CHECKLIST AND TEST RECORD.
On appeal defendant claims that he lacked culpable
intent for tampering with evidence because, when he attempted to
flush the checklist and test record down the toilet, he did not
6

believe that they had any significance.

In support, defendant

apparently argues that (1) he did not contemplate any official
proceeding because he intended to plead guilty to DUI in any
event, and (2) since these papers had apparently been given to
him, he reasonably assumed they were not evidence to be made
available in any investigation or proceeding.
In order to successfully challenge the jury's verdict
the reviewing court must find that the evidence and its
inferences are so "inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted."
State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).

In undertaking

such review, the appellate court will "view the evidence, along
with the reasonable inferences from it, in the light most
favorable to the verdict."

State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 738

(Utah App. 1990) (citation omitted).

"tS]o long as some evidence

and reasonable inferences support the jury's findings, [the
court] will not disturb them.
345 (Utah 1985)."

See State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342,

Ibid.

To meet this burden, defendant must marshal all the
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that even
viewing it in the light most favorable to the verdict, the
evidence is insufficient.

Failure to so marshal the evidence

waives an appellant's right to have his claim of insufficiency
considered on appeal.

Moore, 802 P.2d at 738-39.

In this case there was sufficient evidence, which
7

defendant has failed to marshal, from which the jury could
reasonably have inferred that defendant acted with culpable
intent in attempting to flush the checklist and test record down
the toilet.
Utah Code Ann, § 76-8-510 (1990) provides, in pertinent
part:
A person commits a felony of the second
degree if, believing that an official
proceeding or investigation is pending or
about to be instituted, he:
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or
removes anything with a purpose to impair its
verity or availability in the proceeding or
investigation[.]
1.

Defendant's Belief Concerning
Pending and Imminent Investigations
and Official Proceedings.
Upon arriving at the jail Officer Brown established

that defendant understood that he had been arrested on DUI (T.
28).

At the conclusion of the intoxilyzer test defendant was

aware that his blood alcohol content was more than double the
legal limit and that the results of the test had been printed out
on the test record (T. 37-38, 64, 91). Upon these facts it was
clear that not only was?, defendant already involved in an
investigation, but that a prosecution for DUI was about to be
instituted.

Furthermore, and notwithstanding defendant's

protestations that he did not believe that prosecution was
imminent because of his alleged intent to plead guilty to DUI,
Officer Brown testified that the checklist and test record would
have to be offered in evidence at an administrative hearing
before the Driver's License Division to establish whether (1)
8

there had been probable cause for an arrest and (2) there were
grounds for suspending defendant's license (T. 66). Defendant
would have known these hearings would take place even if he
pleaded guilty, a fact the jury could reasonably have inferred
from defendant's three prior DUI arrests.

Thus, the evidence was

sufficient to establish that defendant knew that, regardless of
whether or not he pleaded guilty, an official proceeding was
about to be instituted, apart from the very investigation then
on-going.
2.

Defendant's Intent to Make
Evidence Unavailable.
Defendant evidently argues that he believed the papers

which subsequently turned out to be the checklist and test record
had effectively been given to him and, thus, were not in his mind
evidence which would have to have been available in any
investigation or proceeding.

However, there was sufficient

evidence from which the jury could have inferred that defendant
was perfectly aware that the papers placed near him were not his,
but rather significant evidence necessary to prove DUI.
Immediately after the toilet flushing incident, both
Officers Brown and Thacker confronted defendant, stating that any
papers that had been given to him were taken right back (R. 2526).

At trial Officer Brown testified that since the time the

intoxilyzer test had become part of the regular DUI investigation
procedure he had not given test results to defendants (R. 51).
Even if defendant believed that the checklist and test record had
been placed in his "little section," the jury could reasonably
9

have doubted that he considered them his. The test record is a
triplicate form composed of a two thin sheets backed by a thicker
third sheet (T. 50; State's Ex. 2). The top sheet bore the
original imprint of the intoxilyzer, indicating the results of
the test, along with Officer Brown's original handwriting.
Officer Brown had not torn out any of the sheets (R. 50). He
also confirmed that it would be more difficult to convict a
defendant without being able to produce the intoxilyzer test
record (R. 70). Thus, defendant would have had the jury believe
that the State was surrendering to him all of its documentary
evidence attesting to his level of intoxication, significant
evidence in either a trial or administrative proceeding, a
defense made all the more improbable considering defendant's
prior experience with three DUI proceedings.
Defendant also argues that he considered the papers
unimportant because he already had made up his mind to plead
guilty to DUI. Defendant's prior experience with DUI
proceedings, which presumably also consisted of appearances
before the Driver's License Division, undermines this claim, as
argued above. However, the jury could reasonably have inferred
that this claim was specious on the facts of the instant
investigation.
When confronted by Officer Brown after the toilet
flushing incident, defendant claimed that he had already informed
the officer of his intention to plead guilty when he told the
officer he had been drinking when first pulled over (R. 24-25).
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Officer Brown immediately retorted that defendant's
acknowledgment that he had been drinking was not a statement of
defendant's intention to plead guilty and that defendant could
still plead not guilty (R. 24-25), an outcome borne out by
subsequent events. At trial Officer Brown testified that when he
spoke to defei;dant after he had been pulled over, defendant said
that he had a few beers and that he had been fishing.

It was

only after the toilet flushing incident that defendant told him
that he was guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol (T.
46) .
In sum, the evidence could reasonably have supported an
inference that defendant's claim about pleading guilty was merely
a sham alibi hastily trotted out to cover his attempt to dispose
of the test record and checklist.

Indeed, Officer Brown stated

that following the incident defendant was no longer cooperative,
started playing "mind games," and kept asking to make a deal (T.
60; R. 23).
The most corroborating evidence was defendant's sudden
need to again relieve himself, followed by his suspicious
disposal of the evidence.

When stopped, defendant's van

contained sixteen empty beer cans (T. 25). There was clear
evidence that defendant had a strong urge to urinate when finally
allowed to use the restroom (T. 92). Both Officer Thacker and
defendant testified that defendant used the toilet the first time
he went to the restroom (T. 75, 105). A mere seven minutes after
having relieved himself defendant again asked to use the restroom
11

(T. 40, 76). Officer Thacker did not recall seeing anything in
defendant's hands on the way to the restroom (T. 86). There was
no testimony that defendant actually used the toilet. Rather,
defendant held his hand as if using the toilet. As defendant
engaged Officer Thacker in conversation, while watching the
policeman over his shoulder, the wadded evidence fell into the
toilet.

When defendant noticed Officer Thacker starting toward

him, he flushed the toilet (T. 78). From this evidence,
characterized as it was by the State's witness, the jury could
reasonably have inferred that defendant was deliberately
attempting to dispose of evidence he believed was being used in
the present investigation or an official proceeding yet to be
instituted.
Defendant argues that this Court should find the
evidence in this case insufficient, as it did in State v. Harman,
767 P.2d 567 (Utah App. 1989).

In Harman, this Court reversed a

jury conviction because the evidence demonstrated that, while the
defendant disapproved of a certain report, he had nonetheless
sent copies of it to other responsible officials.

Thus, this

Court stated that the "evidence of guilt was so slight, so
conflicting, and so inherently improbable that reasonable minds
could not have concluded that [defendant tampered with the
evidence], rather than rejecting it because it was a 'bad
report.'"

IcL at 569.
The defense in this case relied exclusively on

defendant's testimony.

"The jury is not obliged to believe a
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defendant's evidence where there is sufficient evidence of guilt
presented."

State v. Eaton. 701 P.2d 496 (Utah 1985) (per

curiam) (holding the defendant's startled response to discovery
of his wrongful manipulation of an intoxilyzer which produced
results which he then tried to void sufficient evidence of
tampering).

In contradistinction to both defendant's evidence in

this case and the quantum of evidence presented in Harman, the
State showed that defendant removed evidence from the booking
table and intentionally tried to dispose of it in a surreptitious
manner.
In sum,

fl

[a]ny argument that fair minded jurors could

not reasonably believe that the defendant 'concealed or removed'
that evidence does not seem to harmonize with ordinary experience
and common sense."

State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794 (Utah 1977).

Further, because defendant has failed to marshal all the evidence
from which the jury might reasonably have inferred that defendant
acted with culpable intent, this Court should decline to consider
defendant's appeal on its merits.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State requests that
defendant's conviction for tampering with evidence be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /7

day of August, 1993.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

'

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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this /*?

day of August, 1993.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

Utah Code Ann. (1990)
76-8-510. Tampering with evidence*
A person commits a felony of the second
degree if, believing that an official
proceeding or investigation is pending or
about to be instituted, he:
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or
removes anything with a purpose to impair its
verity or availability in the proceeding or
investigation; or
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything
which he knows to be false with a purpose to
deceive a public servant who is or may be
engaged in a proceeding or investigation.

